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REFORMING FLORIDA'S JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM:
A CASE EXAMPLE OF BOBBYM. V. CHILES
JoDI SIEGEL*
I. LGATION AS A REFORM STRATEGY
T he Racial and Ethnic Bias Study Commission Report' is an excel-
lent example of official acknowledgment and exposure of a prob-
lem that is not always publicly recognized. Unfortunately, reform
does not always follow expos6. Often, those who have the power to
institute change must be prodded by advocates to do so.
Many advocacy tools exist to help force change: lobbying for statu-
tory changes and increased funding in the Legislature, urging agency
officials to modify their policies or practices, challenging agency rules
in formal administrative hearings, organizing local initiatives, garner-
ing public and media support for certain issues, and vindicating civil
rights through litigation.2
Litigation becomes necessary when other avenues of reform fall.
However, systemic reform litigation generally is a long, cumbersome
process in which patience as well as persistence is necessary to achieve
the ultimate goals.3 Often, enforcement of consent decrees and judi-
* Attorney, Southern Legal Counsel, Inc. B.A., 1982, New College (Honors College of
University of South Florida); J.D., 1985, University of Florida College of Law.
Southern Legal Counsel is lead counsel representing the plaintiffs in the monitoring phase of
Bobby M. As one of plaintiffs' counsel in this case, this author's role is to advocate. However,
in writing this Article, an effort was made to fairly and objectively present the facts and issues.
The author wishes to express her appreciation to Alice K. Nelson and Albert J. Hadeed for
their assistance.
1. REPORT AND REcOMMENDATIONs OF TnE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT RAcIAL AND ETmuc
BIAS STUDy ComlssioN (1991), reprinted in 19 FLA. ST. U. L. R.v. 591 (1992) (reprinted with
permission) [hereinafter BrAs STUDY CommissloN REPORT].
2. The private enforcement of public interests through civil rights litigation is referred to
as the private attorney general concept. To encourage private enforcement efforts, Congress pro-
vided that prevailing civil rights litigants are entitled to attorney's fees and expenses paid by the
losing party. Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988). For discussions
of the policy bases for the "private attorney general" concept, see Carl Cheng, Important Rights
and the Private Attorney General Doctrine, 73 CAL. L. Rnv. 1929 (1985); Bryant Garth et al.,
The Institution of the Private Attorney General: Perspectives from an Empirical Study of Class
Action Litigation, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 353 (1987); Comment, Court Awarded Attorney's Fees
and EqualAccess to the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. R-v. 636 (1974).
3. For an excellent treatise on the winding 10-year path of the federal litigation to reform
the Willowbrook institution for persons with developmental disabilities, see David J. Rothman &
Sheila M. Rothman, THE WmaowBRooK WARS (1984) (on history of New York Ass'n of Re-
tarded Children v. Carey, 596 F.2d 27 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 836 (1979); 631 F.2d 162
(2d Cir. 1980); 706 F.2d 956 (2d Cir. 1983)).
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cial orders takes longer and is more adversarial than the litigation to
obtain the desired relief. But where otherwise intractable problems go
beyond an individual's particular circumstances, and where the reme-
dies involve transforming a service delivery system, litigation is an in-
dispensable element of reform efforts.
Such was the case in 1983 when child advocates4 filed a federal class
action suit against several state officials for their failure to improve
the inhumane and unsanitary conditions of Florida's juvenile training
schools.5 As discussed below, state officials had known about the de-
teriorating conditions of the training schools for several years before
the lawsuit, but no changes had been made.6
Moreover, litigation was especially warranted because the youths
victimized by the unconstitutional conditions had neither political nor
social power to effect change. It is a truism that juveniles adjudicated
delinquent are often illiterate and unsophisticated in accessing the po-
litical process. As a group, they evoke little sympathy.7 They do not
comprise a constituency capable of hiring a powerful lobbying ma-
chine. Furthermore, as the Study Commission Report reveals, minor-
ity youths are underrepresented in the judicial process,' even though
they are overrepresented in the delinquency system. 9
4. The suit was filed by attorneys from several public interest organizations: the National
Prison Project in Washington, D.C.; Southern Legal Counsel, Inc. in Gainesville; and the Youth
Law Center in San Francisco.
5. Bobby M. v. Graham, No. 83-7003-MMP (N.D. Fla. filed Jan. 5, 1983) (through FED.
R. Civ. P. 25(d), automatic substitution of successor Governors, case now known as Bobby M.
v. Chiles).
6. See infra notes 29-40.
7. See, e.g., Hon. F.D. Alvarez, The Failures and Inadequacies of the Juvenile Justice
System, I HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY BAR Ass'N LAWYER 11 (1991) (delinquent children are "vic-
timizers" not "victims").
8. See BIAS STUDY ConssIoN REPORT, supra note 1. Cf. FLORIDA BAR/FLA. BAR FOUND.
JT. COMM'N ON DELIVERY oF LEGAL SERVS. TO THE INDIGENr IN FLA., OPENING THE DOORS TO
JUsTICE-THE QUEST TO PROVIDE ACCESS FOR THE POOR IN FLORIDA 38 (1991) (Special needs
groups such as children and institutionalized persons have unique legal problems and are at risk
because of inadequate resources to ensure protection of their legal rights and well-being.).
9. Minority youths account for 68% of the youths confined inside the fence at the two
training schools, which are the most restrictive placements in Florida's juvenile justice system.
CHILDREN, YOUTH & FAmLY Szavs., DEr'T oF HRS, OuTcomE EVALUATION REPORT 382 (Dec.
1990) (statistics for the 1989-90 fiscal year). Interestingly, the minority population percentage is
lower for the transitional nonsecure cottages outside the fence of the training schools: Dozier is
66.4% minority and Eckerd is 62.1%. Id. Minority youths account for 59% of those placed in
the less restrictive nonresidential and residential community-based commitment programs. Id. at
348, 366. One delinquency service program, Eckerd Wilderness Camp Program, serves primarily
white males-only 24% are minorities. Id. at 394. The Wilderness Camp serves severely emo-
tionally and behaviorally disturbed youth in an outdoor environment.
Unfortunately, the disproportionate incarceration of minority youth is a national trend. See
IRA M. SCHWARTZ, (IN)JUSTICE FOR JuvENs 47, 143 (1989) (Overrepresentation of minority
BOBBYM.
This Article focuses on Bobby M. as one case example of the op-
portunities and challenges faced by advocates who attempt to reform
a social service delivery system through federal litigation. It details the
history of the suit, explains the consent decrees, and examines the suc-
cesses and obstacles of implementing the decrees. The Juvenile Justice
Reform Act of 1990 and the impact of the recent budget shortfalls are
also discussed.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF FLORIDA'S TRAINING ScHooLs
On January 1, 1900, Florida joined the national trend'0 to separate
juvenile offenders1 from adult criminals and opened its first juvenile
institution. Located in Marianna, it was called the Florida State Re-
form School,' 2 and it served both black and white boys and girls. The
Marianna school was built with two campuses: one served black youth
and the other served white youth. The Act, which authorized funds
for the original school, mandated that "the colored and white con-
victs shall not be in any manner associated together, or worked to-
gether, or instructed in the same building."' 3 In 1965, a plan was
drawn for total integration at the school-two years after a federal
court action alleged violations of the Fourteenth Amendment on be-
half of several black children in Florida training schools.' 4 Two years
later, the school finally was integrated. Also in 1967, the school was
named after Arthur G. Dozier, a superintendent for many years.
Reform schools also opened in Ocala (1913) and in Okeechobee
(1959). Ocala initially housed only girls; Okeechobee housed only
boys. Both were racially segregated. Although both became coeduca-
tional, in 1978 all girls were transferred to Ocala and no girls have
youths in publicly operated juvenile detention and correctional facilities, and of white youths in
private facilities, suggests an evolving national trend with black, Hispanic, and Native American
youth in public institutions and whites in private facilities, including private psychiatric hospitals
as the "new jails" for middle and upper-middle class children.).
10. For a history of how juvenile delinquents were treated in this era, see A. PLATr, TBE
CE=w SAvEas (1960). It is a long-standing principle that the purpose of juvenile justice is to
rehabilitate and to reduce delinquency rather than to punish. See ScHwARTz, supra note 9, at ch.
1. That axiom continues today. See Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, 42
U.S.C. §§ 5601, 5602(b) (1988); FLA. STAT. § 39.002 (Supp. 1990).
11. Several years later, the Legislature approved sending "incorrigible children" to the re-
form school as well as convicted offenders. See FLA. H.R. SELECT COMM. ON JUVENME JUST.,
SuBcomm. REPORT OF FLORmA's TRaAsnno SCHOOLS 2 (1982) [hereinafter SELECT Comm. RE-
PORT].
12. Id. Reform schools today are referred to as training schools.
13. "An Act to Provide for the Locating and Erecting a State Reform School, and to Ap-
propriate Money Therefor," FLA. STAT. ch. 4565 (1897), quoted in SELECT Comm. REPORT, su-
pra note 11, at 1.
14. See SELECT COMM. REPORT, supra note 11, at 6.
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since been admitted to the other two schools.' 5 The Ocala school,
eventually named after its long-time superintendent Alyce D. Mc-
Pherson, was closed in 1984 as a result of the Bobby M. suit.16 Also in
that year, services at the Florida School for Boys in Okeechobee were
contracted to a private agency and became the Eckerd Youth Develop-
ment Center.
In 1968, the Constitution of the State of Florida was revised. 17
Through the newly authorized executive structure of state govern-
ment, the Legislature created the Department of Health and Rehabili-
tative Services (HRS).' " The previously autonomous agency
responsible for training school management was transferred to HRS'
Division of Youth Services and its Bureau of Training Schools. In
1975, HRS was reorganized into eleven districts around the state, with
program policy development at the central (Tallahassee) office.' 9 At
that time, the administration of each training school was assigned to
the local HRS district in which it was located.
Also in 1975, the Legislature directed that status offenders-runa-
ways, truants, and ungovernable children-be considered dependent
rather than delinquent children.20 With status offenders no longer
placed at training schools, the school populations were substantially
reduced. 2' Despite these reductions, by May 1981 the training schools
were overcrowded and housed almost 900 children, more than half of
whom were black.22 Dozier was budgeted for a capacity of 270 youths,
but it had a population of 380 in August 1981. 23 Cottages built to
serve 25 youths were housing more than 35.2 McPherson was serving
about 180 children (half boys and half girls), exceeding its budgeted
capacity. 2 The Florida School for Boys was budgeted for 360 boys,
yet at times it housed more than 415.26 Adding to these problems, or
perhaps in response to them, escapes were increasing at all three
schools. 27
15. Id. at 7.
16. See infra note 71.
17. FLA. CONST. art. XII, § 1 (constitution of 1885 superseded).
18. The purposes, structure and powers of HRS are set forth in section 20.19, Florida Sta-
tutes.
19. SELECT COmm. REPORT, supra note 11, at 6.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 16. Fifty-two percent were black. Id.
23. Id. at 18.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 24.
26. Id. at 29.
27. Id. at 19, 26, 29.
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In 1982, the Florida House Select Committee on Juvenile Justice
issued a report on Florida's training schools. The Committee was
alarmed at the overcrowding, lack of security, understaffing, lack of
aftercare, deficient academic and vocational programs, and "top
heavy" HRS administration. 2 Recommendations included increasing
youths' lengths of stay to allow for proper programming and habilita-
tion,29 implementing monthly in-service training courses for housepar-
ents,30 establishing a diagnostic and evaluation team to develop a
rehabilitation and one-year tracking plan following release from a fa-
cility,3' improving quality and increasing quantity of vocational pro-
grams, 32 and reviewing the managerial structure between HRS and the
training schools. 33 In addition to these constructive recommendations,
the Committee focused on seemingly trivial concerns in suggesting
that to improve security it "strongly support[ed] the implementation
of rules and regulations governing the hairstyles of the children within
the training schools. The youth should be required to have their hair
cut to a reasonable length, within good taste, and they must be clean
shaven.' '34
Later that year, HRS' Inspector General issued a scathing report on
Dozier that confirmed many youths' complaints about the inhumane
conditions under which they were confined.3 5 For example, youngsters
were shackled and hogtied 6 while in locked isolation cells-frequently
for such minor reasons as "cussing" staff, being loud, and beating on
doors; youngsters placed in isolation cells were seldom afforded exer-
cise (a violation of HRS rules);37 youngsters also were placed in gen-
eral lock-up 3 for slight infractions (again in violation of HRS rules); 39
28. Id. at 33-40.
29. Id. at 34.
30. Id. at 37.
31. Id. at 37. These concepts of aftercare and reentry have been implemented as required by
the Bobby M. consent decrees.
32. Id. at 38.
33. Id. at 40.
34. Id. at 36.
35. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND REHABILI-
TATIVE SERVIcEs: ARTHuR G. DOZIER SCHOOL IN MARIANNA, FLA. (Oct. 25, 1982).
36. Hogtying is a restraint practice in which hands and feet are shackled together behind the
back. See also infra text accompanying notes 54-56.
37. FLA. ADmN. CODE ANN. r. 10H-2.36 (1982) (currently codified at r. 1OH-2.036).
38. Lock-up was euphemistically called the "adjustment unit." At Dozier, the adjustment
unit contained three larger rooms housing about six boys each and 10 isolation rooms. These
units have since been closed. See infra note 70.
39. HRS rules permitted the use of the adjustment unit if a child was a danger to others,
was a definite immediate threat to the security of the program, maliciously destroyed property of
others, or had an unauthorized absence from the grounds. FLA. ADMaN. CODE ANN. r. 1OH-2.36
1991]
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older and larger youngsters were used to control the behavior of other
youngsters in the cottages; and there was an immediate need to reesta-
blish a viable treatment program.
Despite official reports and recommendations concerning the deteri-
orating conditions and environment of the training schools, little
changed. Overcrowding swelled and violence increased. In short, con-
ditions were shockingly abusive and inhumane. When the officials
failed to improve the training schools, litigation ensued.
III. THE LrriGA=r RESPONSE
A. Initial Phase
Bobby M. v. Graham was filed in January 1983. The plaintiff class
sought declaratory and injunctive relief from the cruel, abusive, inad-
equate, and inappropriate conditions of confinement that violated
rights guaranteed by federal4° and state41 law. As discussed, 42 these
conditions endangered plaintiffs' physical and psychological health
and safety; deprived them of meaningful access to, or opportunity
for, rehabilitation, treatment and education; and restricted their ac-
cess to and communication with their families, the community, and
the juvenile courts. In particular, plaintiffs sought prospective relief
from the intolerable conditions at the institutions. These included the
abusive disciplinary practices outlined above, overcrowding, inappro-
priate placements, unsanitary and dangerous physical conditions,
poor security, lack of adequate staff, inadequate medical and psycho-
logical care, inappropriate educational programming, lack of due
(1982) (currently codified at r. 1OH-2.036). A considerable number of youths were placed in the
adjustment unit in technical compliance with HRS rules under the catch-all category of "threat
to the security of the program." Although the rule continues to contain the same criteria, the
federal court in Bobby M. issued a 1984 order superseding the state rule. The order provides that
youths will be placed in the "security unit" only to quell a riot, prevent immediate physical
injury to the youth or another person, prevent immediate and real damage to property, or to
prevent an imminent escape. For more details about this order, see infra text accompanying note
70.
40. The plaintiffs sought to redress rights secured to them by the First, Sixth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
of 1974 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982)); and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (1982)).
41. The pendent state claims were voluntarily dismissed after Pennhurst State School &
Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984) (federal courts prohibited under Eleventh Amend-
ment from awarding damages and retroactive injunctive relief against state officials on the basis
of state law). For a discussion of the impact of Pennhurst on systemic litigation, see David
Rudenstine, Pennhurst and the Scope of Federal Judicial Power to Reform Social Institutions, 6
CARDozo L. Rnv. 71 (1984).
42. See supra text accompanying notes 28-39.
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process in disciplinary matters, mail censorship, deprivation of access
to courts and attorneys, and lack of aftercare. 41
The four original named plaintiffs" were deposed in 1983; two were
again deposed in 1986. They testified to the atrocities they endured.
For example, Susan S. testified that residents often found insects in
their food. When residents refused to eat, however, they were con-
fined to an isolation unit. 45 Susan herself was confined once for thirty-
eight consecutive days, and another time for twenty-one days, in a
small, bare cell without heat or adequate ventilation and without any
treatment, counseling, recreation, or other activities. 46
Salvadore S. described inadequate control of contagious diseases
and unhygienic and medically unsafe infirmaries. When he contracted
chicken pox at the training school, Salvadore was locked with three
other boys in a small, hot, unairconditioned storage room. He was
not allowed to bathe or to change his clothes or his bed sheets daily.47
Bobby M. testified to the staff's use of children to discipline other
children and to the use of tracking dogs to hunt down those who at-
tempted to escape. 4" He alleged that he was once hogtied, a practice
prohibited by HRS policy but routinely used at the schools. 49
Charles W. revealed that because of institutional overcrowding he
and many others were required to sleep on mattresses on the floor for
extended periods. Some boys slept on the floor in the dining room.50
Charles also detailed the lack of educational programs. Although nine
years old when originally confined to a training school and in need of
special education services, he had been placed in the same classroom
and given the same work as the sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds. 51
Unusual incident reports52 revealed that an abusive and inhumane
environment was pervasive and not limited to the named plaintiffs'
experiences. Sexual abuse, physical abuse, and attempted suicides
were common.53
43. Pls.' Third Am. Class Action Compl. for Inj. & Declaratory Relief (Jan. 26, 1987).
44. Three named plaintiffs, Raymond C., Richard 0., and Thomas P., were later added as
a prudent measure to avoid mootness because the court had not yet certified the class. See Pls.'
Second Am. Compl. (June 2, 1986). Two of the original named plaintiffs had become adults and
none was confined to a training school at that time.
45. Dep. Susan S. at 60-61 (Apr. 8, 1983).
46. Dep. Susan S. at 121-22 (Apr. 8, 1986).
47. Dep. Salvadore S. at 70-71, 100-01 (Apr. 8, 1983).
48. Dep. Bobby M. at 74-77 (Mar. 22, 1983).
49. Id. at 27-29.
50. Dep. Charles W. at 93 (Apr. 4, 1983).
51. Dep. Charles W. at 30-31 (Apr. 29, 1986).
52. Unusual incident reports are forms filled out by institutional staff for incidents that are
considered out of the ordinary.
53. See Pls.' Req. for Admis. to HRS Defs., app. at 32-85 (Sept. 6, 1985) (32-50, Okeecho-
19911
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Perhaps the most abusive condition was the practice of hogtying. In
this painful form of restraint, wrists were handcuffed behind the
back, legs shackled, and the wrist and leg shackles joined together be-
hind the back so that the child was forced to lie with only chest, abdo-
men, and upper thighs touching the ground. To make matters worse,
some hogtied children were forced to lie on bare floors or concrete
beds, or were shackled to toilets or other fixed objects in the lock-up
units. Youths severely acting out were even rolled in bed sheets to cre-
ate makeshift straight-jackets. These inhumane practices continued
even though the defendants' own policy manuals specifically prohib-
ited them.5 4 Contemporaneous with the filing of their complaint,
plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction to stop hogtying. 5- The
court granted the preliminary injunction and entered an order prohib-
iting the restraint of children in any unnatural position, regulating the
use of permissible restraints, and appointing a monitor to oversee the
order's implementation.5 6
The serious concerns raised by the litigation were supported by vari-
ous governmental agencies and their reports. These bureaucratic res-
ponses acknowledged the problems. Yet despite the existence of the
litigation and the preliminary injunction, recommendations for im-
provement were weak. For example, the Governor's Office conducted
a management review of HRS' Youth Placement Office in October
1983. 57 Regarding the placement of delinquent juveniles, the review
found that the primary factor determining where youths were placed
in the juvenile justice system was the availability of a vacant bed."
Further, "speciai needs" delinquents-those with mental health prob-
lems or developmental disabilities-usually were placed in the more
restrictive programs such as training schools because of the absence of
necessary services in less restrictive community placements. 9 Thus, the
findings revealed serious flaws in the juvenile justice system. Yet the
major recommendations merely were that the issue of special needs
required detailed study, that HRS should seek an expansion in com-
mitment resources, that HRS should continue its dialogue with juve-
bee: Selected Reports on Sexual Abuse; 51-65, Okeechobee: Selected Reports on Attempted Sui-
cides; 66-85, Okeechobee: Selected Reports on Physical Abuse).
54. See, e.g., Dep't of HRS Reg. 175-1 § 6(b) (Mar. 1983) (youth will be restrained in a
natural position; no youth may be restrained by being shackled to any fixed object).
55. Pls.' Mot. for Prelim. Inj. (Jan. 04, 1983).
56. Order on Prelim. In. (July 14, 1983).
57. OFFICE OF THE Gov., MANAGEMENT REVIEw OF THE OFFICE OF CENTRAL ADMISSIONS AND
INTERSTATE COMPACT, M-83-32A (Oct. 1983) (on file with Southern Legal Counsel).
58. Id. at 36.
59. Id. at 37.
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nile judges, that the statutory five-day placement requirement 6° should
be waived for special needs youths, and that the feasibility of develop-
ing in-depth assessment services and of automating should be exam-
ined. 61
Further, in response to various complaints, the Statewide Human
Rights Advocacy Committee (SHRAC) 62 investigated the conditions
and treatment of children in the Eckerd Youth Development Center
(EYDC).63 Among other findings, SHRAC reported that, although
approximately sixty percent of the youths were black and a "sizable
portion" were Hispanic, only a few black professionals and one Span-
ish-speaking professional were available to work with the children.
SHRAC recommended active recruitment of black and Hispanic
professionals. 64
In a report submitted to SHRAC by EYDC, the institution claimed
that it was being used by the juvenile courts and HRS as a "kid ware-
house." 65 EYDC admitted that at least half of its residents were inap-
propriately placed in its care, because training schools should be used
only as a last resort. 66 Although EYDC identified the problem, it
made no recommendations.
The Auditor General confirmed that inappropriate placements at
the training schools were a major problem. Data collected in 1986
during site visits to the Eckerd and Dozier facilities 67 revealed that
62.570 of the youths did not meet the training school admission crite-
ria.6 The Auditor General made several recommendations, including
60. The law provided that children must be removed from detention and placed into a pro-
gram within five days of being committed to HRS. FLA. STAT. § 959.12 (1989). This section was
repealed in 1990. Ch. 90-208, § 17, 1990 Fla. Laws 855, 917. The current statutory provision
mandates release from detention within five days of commitment to HRS, but it allows HRS to
seek a court order extending the use of detention care to 15 days. FIA. STAT. § 39.044(11) (Supp.
1990).
61. Id. at 40-42.
62. SHRAC is a statutorily created body whose members are appointed by the Governor to
monitor HRS programs and its contract providers, to investigate complaints, and to make re-
commendations for resolution. FLA. STAT. § 402.165 (1989).
63. Pls.' Req. for Admis. to HRS Defs., supra note 53, app. 12-21 (1984) (reprinting
SHRAC TRAINING SCHOOL SUBcomm., REPORT ON EcKERD FOUNDATION YOUTH DEVELOPMENT
CENTER, OKEECHOBEE).
64. Id. at 17.
65. Pls.' Req. for Admis. to HRS Defs., supra note 53, app. 22-31 (1984) (reprinting EYDC
CLIENT SERvs. DEP'T, No OTHER ALTERNATVE? A REPORT ON INAPPROPRIATE PLACEmNTS AT
EYDC).
66. Id. at 23.
67. AUDrTOR GEN., PERFORMANCE Auirr OF THE TRAuIN SCHOOLS OF HRS 44 (Sept. 22,
1987) (available in Office of Auditor Gen., Tallahassee, Fla.).
68. Id. at 11. The Auditor General noted that by diverting these youths to a less restrictive
residential program the state could save approximately $3 million in annual treatment costs. Id.
at 19.
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that HRS reexamine its delinquency continuum and shift resources so
that boys would more likely be assigned to programs at the restrictive-
ness levels that best matched their needs and offense histories. 69
Meanwhile, the litigation progressed and some changes were effec-
tuated through negotiation. Before the final consent decrees, the par-
ties preliminarily resolved several other issues. The court granted a
joint proposed order establishing criteria for admission to the security
unit and to the isolation units, providing minimum standards of care,
limiting the time youths may spend in isolation, establishing adminis-
trative and medical review of isolation use, and appointing the moni-
tor overseeing the implementation of the hogtying injunction to also
oversee this order.70 The court also approved the parties' stipulation to
close the McPherson training school and bar from admission to the
remaining two schools boys aged thirteen or younger, all girls, and all
status offenders. 7 1
The defendants also agreed to reduce the populations at the training
schools, although the parties could not agree to a specific plan. They
did stipulate, however, that two mutually agreed upon experts would
develop a comprehensive assessment of existing community programs
for committed delinquent youth and develop a preliminary plan for
systematically reducing the training school population to the lowest
number possible.72
As is typical in federal class action systemic reform litigation, how-
ever, all issues were not resolved through amicable negotiations. The
agreement to agree on a population reduction plan was the last sub-
stantive preliminary agreement reached between the parties. The ex-
perts' preliminary plan was to be made final by a further agreement
between the parties, but those negotiations broke down and this par-
ticular effort was never completed.7 3 From late 1985 until the final
69. Id. at 19. Although the Auditor General's investigation was conducted before the entry
of the final consent decrees in Bobby M., the report was not published until after the suit was
settled. The report thus noted that HRS had committed itself in the consent decree to reexamine
its existing programs and to develop new programs in order to maximize the state's resources to
meet individual youths' needs and public safety interests. Id. at 20.
70. Order on Use of Security Units and Lock-up (July 5, 1984).
71. Order (Aug. 6, 1985). Status offenders were defined as children who are committed to
HRS on the basis of: (a) a dependency order; (b) a violation of a court order, the underlying
offense for which is a status offense; or (c) the nonfelonious running away from a nonsecure
placement. Order 5.
72. Stip. & Order (Aug. 28, 1985).
73. The experts' plan made a number of recommendations to improve the placement proc-
ess, restructure particular individual programs, and redesign HRS management of the juvenile
system. DeMuro's Report on Plan to Reduce Population at Training Schools 3-34 (Apr. 5,
1986). Additionally, the consultants addressed issues concerning implementation of a phase
BOBBYM.
negotiations in early 1987, the State vigorously defended the suit pri-
marily by objecting to the plaintiffs' pretrial discovery.
B. The Consent Decrees
On the eve of trial,74 the parties feverishly negotiated the terms of
three consent decrees. The first decree to be resolved was the issue of
youths' right to counsel and access to courts.7 5 Youths in training
schools often were presented with a multitude of legal issues. Some
had pending criminal charges in their hometowns. Some were admit-
ted to the training schools under illegal commitment orders. Some had
judges who illegally denied their release from the training schools.
Some had family issues that needed to be resolved through the de-
pendency system before they could be released. And many were mis-
classified for treatment purposes at the training schools and lacked
any aftercare upon release. Yet, as the complaint alleged, the defen-
dants deprived training school youths of access to the courts by failing
to inform them that they could make or receive phone calls to and
from attorneys and by failing to assist the children in any way with
their legal problems. 76
The lack of access to attorneys was complicated by the location of
the training schools. Because the schools were distant from cities, an
on-campus visit by an attorney was rare. Further, public defender rep-
resentation typically ended with the commitment order and did not
extend to placement, treatment, or discharge issues. Children lacked
the financial means to retain private counsel and were incapable of
representing themselves because of their age, educational, and intellec-
tual levels.7 7 Also, because of illiteracy, lack of sophistication, or dis-
trust, youths could not or would not articulate their legal problems to
training school staff.
The right-to-counsel decree provided that the defendants78 would
present a plan for providing independent legal representation to train-
down of population and eventual closing of the training schools. Id. at 35-43. They suggested an
initial goal of capping the training school population at approximately 120 youth per facility
before any closure could be accomplished. Id. The Department filed a response to the plan stat-
ing that 160 youths per facility was the optimal daily population, but that it would take at least
three years and sufficient legislative appropriations for aftercare and reentry services. Response
to DeMuro Report 2-3 (June 4, 1986). The final consent decree, however, resolved the over-
crowding issue. See infra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
74. Trial was scheduled for May 1987.
75. Order Granting Stip. Mot. Resolving Right to Counsel Claim (May 4, 1987).
76. Third Am. Compl., count 10, at 23.
77. See Stip. Mot. Resolving Right to Counsel Claim at 1.
78. All of the defendants except the Commissioner of Education were a party to this decree.
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ing school youths on issues that included: appropriateness of place-
ment at the training school, discharge and aftercare issues, and civil
matters arising after commitment to HRS.7 9 The decree further pro-
vided that children would be advised of the availability of legal assis-
tance upon admission and that no attorney-client contact would be
impeded.80
The next decree to be settled involved the claims against the defen-
dant Commissioner of Education.81 The plaintiffs had complained
about the inadequacy of the regular, vocational, and special educa-
tional programming at the training schools.8 2 The parties agreed that
the Commissioner would provide all youths in training schools with
general educational services-and where appropriate-with special ed-
ucation. The special education aspects of the decree were the most
detailed. These required identifying and screening children with disa-
bilities; establishing an adequate evaluation system; designing appro-
priate individual education plans; recruiting, training, and appointing
surrogate parents where necessary; providing appropriate special edu-
cation and related services as determined in youths' individual educa-
tion plans (IEPs); training special education teachers and aides;
fulfilling confidentiality and procedural safeguards; and providing ap-
propriate transition services when youth were returned to their home
school districts.8 3 Also, two educational monitors" were agreed upon
by the parties to assess the Commissioner's compliance with this de-
cree.
85
The third decree governed claims against all defendants except the
Commissioner of Education8 6 and mandated comprehensive improve-
ments in the training schools as well as throughout the juvenile justice
system.8 7 Regarding changes at the training schools, the decree re-
79. Stip. Mot. Resolving Right to Counsel Claim 1, at 2. See infra text accompanying
notes 104, 119-21 (discussion on obstacles to implementing this decree).
80. Id. 4-5, at 3.
81. Settlement Agreement Governing Claims Against Def. Castor (filed May 8, 1987), ap-
proved by Final Order Approving Consent Decrees (July 2, 1987) [hereinafter Settlement Agree-
ment].
82. Third Am. Compl., count 7, at 18-20.
83. Settlement Agreement, supra note 81, § VII, at 7-13.
84. Michael C. Nelson, a special education professor at the University of Kentucky in Lex-
ington, and Robert Rutherford, a special education professor at Arizona State University in
Tempe, were plaintiffs' experts who subsequently were appointed as court monitors.
85. Settlement Agreement, supra note 81, § IX, at 13-15.
86. At the time of this decree, the defendants were Governor Bob Martinez, Department of
HRS Secretary Gregory Coler, Dozier Superintendent Roy McKay, and EYDC Superintendent
Samuel Streit.
87. Consent Decree (filed May 8, 1987), approved by Final Order Approving Consent De-
crees (July 2, 1987) [hereinafter HRS Decree].
BOBBYM.
quired that the population be reduced to 100 boys "within the [perim-
eter] fence" at each facility by July 1, 1990.88 Further, the decree
required that each training school immediately have no more than
thirty youths placed in nonsecure transition programs outside the
fence.89 Because the plaintiffs viewed overcrowding as a primary cause
of the chaotic and nonrehabilitative atmosphere of the training
schools, population reduction was essential to implementing a safe
and therapeutic environment. The decree also specified exclusionary
admission criteria for the training schools so that the smaller popula-
tion would consist only of individuals who exhibit serious and/or
chronic delinquent behavior. 90
To alleviate the inhumane and unsanitary conditions that youths in
training schools endured,91 the decree detailed extensive standards for
institutional operations. These standards governed: programming; liv-
ing conditions and sanitation; medical, dental, psychological, and
substance abuse treatment services; staff training; and juvenile rights
and discipline.92
The decree also envisioned statewide reformation of the juvenile
justice system to accommodate the population reductions and restruc-
turing of the training schools. Population reduction in the most re-
strictive environment-training schools-was to correspond with an
increase in the diversity and quantity of lesser restrictive residential
and nonresidential commitment programs around the state. As prior
reports indicated, the entire system was inadequate and placements
were slot driven-based on the availability of a bed-rather than
needs driven-based on the appropriateness of the program for a par-
ticular child. 9
HRS agreed to establish a system of programs and services designed
to meet the needs of the individual juvenile.Y The primary goal of the
88. HRS Decree, supra note 87, § V, at 6-7. This deadline was extended because of a short-
age of cottage beds at Dozier and of placement beds generally throughout the system. Stip. Am.
Pop. Reduction Schedule of Consent Decree (filed July 16, 1990), approved by court (July 21,
1990).
89. HRS Decree, supra note 87, § V, D. A nonsecure transition program was defined as a
residence or cottage where a transitional program is operated under the authority of a training
school and in close proximity to it. Id. The decree allowed the population in the nonsecure
programs to increase in direct proportion to the number of youths below the 100 population cap
in the secure program. Id.
90. Id. § VIII, at 9-10. A waiver system was established for those extraordinary circum-
stances where HRS determines that a training school placement is warranted for a juvenile
within the exclusionary criteria. Id. § VIII, at 10.
91. See supra notes 28-53.
92. HRS Decree, supra note 87, app. B.
93. See supra notes 57-69, 73.
94. HRS Decree, supra note 87, § VI, at 7-8.
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system was to ensure successful reintegration into the juvenile's family
and home community. 95 To accomplish this goal, the decree mandated
that HRS develop a continuum of care and services allowing juveniles
to develop and to receive appropriate services and support throughout
their commitment. 96
Before the decree, assessment by HRS workers of delinquent
youths' needs had been totally inadequate because there was no work-
ing system of determining appropriate placements. This failure rein-
forced the slot-driven nature of the system. Thus, even had there been
a full continuum of services and placements available, there was no
assurance that youths would be appropriately placed. To rectify this,
HRS agreed to develop an assessment, classification, and placement
process for delinquent youths.97 The assessment would be an individu-
alized, multidisciplinary process identifying the priority needs of each
individual for rehabilitation and treatment.9 The classification system
would assign a relative risk factor to each juvenile based upon an ob-
jective evaluation of risk to the child and the community. 99 The place-
ment process would ensure for each juvenile the most appropriate
setting to meet the juvenile's programmatic needs and provide the
minimum security while ensuring public safety. 10°
Finally, to assist in implementing the decree and ensure compliance,
the parties agreed upon Paul DeMuro as the lead monitor. 1 1 Mr.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. § VII, at 8.
98. Id. § VII(l). The regulation drafted as required by the decree provides that where a
youth's prior placement history and/or service intervention do not reflect a need for a special-
ized assessment or treatment, a routine case assessment may be conducted. Dep't of HRS Reg.
175-14 § 4(d) (Jan. 1, 1990). However, where a specialized assessment or treatment is indicated,
assessments of a youth's treatment and service needs are to be conducted by trained profession-
als from such disciplines as education, social services, psychiatry and mental health, medical,
developmental disabilities, and vocational rehabilitation. Id. § 4(e). See also FLA. STAT. § 39.046
(Supp. 1990) (providing that juvenile court may order assessments and treatment in areas such as
education, mental health, substance abuse, or developmental disabilities).
99. HRS Decree, supra note 87, § VII(2), at 8.
100. Id. § VII(3), at 8.
101. Id. § IX(2), at 11. Mr. DeMuro is an expert with considerable experience in operating
and reforming juvenile institutions and service delivery systems.
Court monitors can have a variety of roles in systemic reform litigation. For a good discussion
on the various roles and their effectiveness, see Roy Reynolds et al., Court Monitors and Special
Masters in Mental Disability Litigation: Variables Affecting Implementation of Decrees, 12
MENrA & PnysicA DxsAnxT L. RaP. 322 (1988). See also Murray Levine, The Role of Special
Master in Institutional Reform Litigation: A Case Study, 8 LAW & POL'y 275 (1986). On the
importance of monitoring in institutional reform cases, see RoTmMA & Rom .MN, supra note 3,
at 314-21.
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DeMuro had available a team of experts to help in his technical assis-
tance and monitoring duties. The initial expertise at Mr. DeMuro's
disposal covered institutional conditions and programming, psychol-
ogy, health services, and environmental conditions. 10 2
IV. TnE LITIGATION'S RESULTS
A. Implementation Successes and Obstacles
With considerable technical assistance from the court monitor and
his team of experts, significant improvements at the training schools
were made in the first two years following the consent decrees. The
population reduction was on schedule. Both the staffing levels and
quality of medical and psychological care improved. The discipline
cottages and restraints were properly used. The use of isolation was
eliminated. Serious environmental hazards were corrected. And, im-
portantly, only youths who met the admission criteria were admitted.
To be sure, some critical issues remained,0 3 but for the most part
HRS was reasonably complying with the aspects of the decree that
involved conditions at the training schools. In sum, improvements
were extensive and the horrors of the past were eliminated.
One major exception was the failure of HRS to establish on-site
legal services. Through two one-year Florida Bar Foundation grants,
onsite legal services were provided at EYDC at the time the final de-
crees were entered. These grants were intended as seed money and not
as general, ongoing support. After the grant money was expended,
however, HRS refused to supply continuation funds. 104 Plaintiffs'
counsel attempted to help HRS by seeking outside foundation fund-
102. HRS Decree, supra note 87, § IX(3), at 11.
103. Incomplete medical records were transferred to the training schools upon a youth's ad-
mission, consents were not obtained from youths' parents for dental care, the renovation of
cottages and preventive maintenance at EYDC were not on schedule, and aftercare and perform-
ance agreements were not always sufficient. See Court Monitor DeMuro Report to Court (July
26, 1989). Also, compliance with the educational consent decree has been slow. As of the moni-
tors' June 1991 reports, Dozier was in substantial compliance, but EYDC had some issues to
resolve-primarily involving the lack of certification of their special education teachers. See
Robert Rutherford & Michael C. Nelson, Dozier School for Boys/Washington County Schools
Program Monitoring Report (June 17, 1991) (on file with Southern Legal Counsel); Rutherford
& Nelson, EYDC/Washington County Schools Program Monitoring Report (June 17, 1991) (on
file with Southern Legal Counsel).
104. The consent agreement provided that defendants were not required "to provide the sole
costs associated with providing said representation." Stip. Mot. Resolving Right to Counsel
Claim, 3, at 2 (emphasis added). The defendants, however, offered only to provide inkind
assistance, e.g., office space, utilities, phone, and use of copier. The lack of funds meant that no
attorneys, travel, or court costs could be paid.
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ing, but such efforts yielded only a very small amount-certainly not
enough to satisfy the decree. The parties were at a stalemate.
In stark contrast to the improvements at the institutions, HRS' ref-
ormation of the juvenile justice service delivery system was nonexist-
ent. HRS failed to meet the June 30, 1988, deadline for designing the
multidisciplinary assessment process. 10 5 According to the monitor's re-
ports, the "assessment" process was a pretense for placing youths in
any available slot.10° Strengths, weaknesses, problems, and needs of
individual youths were not adequately addressed at the planning con-
ferences.' °7 Thus, informed placement recommendations were impos-
sibleY' 5 Placements were determined by availability of beds
irrespective of either children's needs or public safety concerns.' 9 De-
termination of which youths needed a multidisciplinary staffing was
often made by staff with insufficient skills training and inadequate
case information. 10 Further, key staff did not regularly attend the
multidisciplinary staffings."'
The monitor also reported that HRS had neither defined an appro-
priate continuum of care and services nor reexamined its existing pro-
grams." 2 It thus had failed the decree's mandate to evaluate, plan,
and provide an appropriate continuum of care and services in the ju-
venile justice system.13 The entire placement system was strained and
in crisis. Children were placed in programs far from their home dis-
tricts, which frustrated any family reintegration attempts. 114 Youths
with vastly different treatment needs were placed together in the same
program, which caused program quality to rapidly deteriorate. And
105. See infra notes 122-23.
106. See, e.g., Court Monitor DeMuro Report to Court 3-4 (Apr. 17, 1989).
107. Planning conferences should be meetings between key HRS personnel, the child, par-
ents, and other knowledgeable persons, with the goal of determining what programs and services
the child needs.
108. See Court Monitor DeMuro Report to Court, supra note 106, at 3-4.
109. Id.
110. Court Monitor DeMuro Report to Court 7 (Nov. 3, 1990).
111. Id.
112. See, e.g., Court Monitor DeMuro Report to Court 2 (July 26, 1989). After much insis-
tence by the monitor to define a continuum, HRS commissioned the monitor and Dick Rachin to
study and propose improvements in the juvenile justice system. Their report was critical of the
current system and offered comprehensive resolutions. DICK RACmHi & PAUL DEMURo, JuvE-
N JUSTICE REF Rm: A PROPOsAL To IMPROVE JUVENILE JUsTiCE SERVICES IN FLORIDA (Apr.
1989). HRS did not adopt the report but instead issued a response to it. Memorandum from
Samuel M. Streit, Ass't Sec'y, Dep't of HRS, to Bob Williams, Deputy Sec'y, Dep't of HRS
(June 2, 1989) (on file with Dep't of HRS).
113. See HRS Decree, supra note 87, § VI, at 7-8.
114. See, e.g., Court Monitor DeMuro Report to Court 5 (Apr. 17, 1989).
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an unfortunate side effect was an increase in the number of youths
treated as adults in the criminal justice system.115
In December 1989, the federal court convened a status conference
to address the major compliance issues. The court approved a stipula-
tion, hammered out after the conference, establishing timetables for
HRS to submit various plans for implementation. 16 HRS was to sub-
mit a plan to meet the environmental and fire safety requirements of
renovating cottages at Dozier, a plan for onsite legal services, a multi-
disciplinary assessment process, and a continuum plan."17
The cottage renovation issue at Dozier involved double bunking
youths until the population was reduced to the final target of 100.
This issue arose because the renovation of Dozier's cottages could not
be scheduled to coincide with the timing of the population cap dates.
Thus, Dozier's cottages were renovated for a bed capacity of 100, ne-
cessitating double bunking until the population was reduced to that
cap.
Adding to the training school bed crisis was the shortage of new
placement beds in the rest of the system-a shortage creating a wait-
ing list for placements in the training schools. To alleviate the bed
crunch, the defendants requested an extension of the target date to
meet the population cap of 100. The parties agreed to extend the tar-
get dates for reaching the cap to March 1991 for EYDC and to De-
cember 1990 for Dozier." 8
Regarding the onsite legal services, the defendants submitted a plan
to plaintiffs' counsel "to aid children confined to training schools
115. See Court Monitor DeMuro Report to Court 3 (Nov. 21, 1991); Court Monitor DeMuro
Report to Court 5 (May 30, 1991). One indicator of the escalating reliance on the adult criminal
justice system for juveniles is that the number of juveniles admitted to adult county jails in-
creased by more than 61% between 1986 and 1988, from 6502 to 10,475. Compare FLA. CR.
FOR CHIMDREN & YoUTH, KEY FAcTs ABOUT Tm CHILDREN 1 (1988) (available from Fla. Ctr. for
Children & Youth, Tallahassee, Fla.) with FLA. CmR. FOR CHI DREN & YoUTH, KEY FACTS ABOUT
Tm CHIDRHEN 1 (1990) (available from Fla. Ctr. for Children & Youth, Tallahassee, Fla.).
Another indicator is that the total number of delinquency cases transferred to adult court
(including direct files, waivers of juvenile sanctions, and indictments) has escalated. The total
number for fiscal year 1986/87 was 3449, but for 1989/90 the number increased to 5792. Gov.'s
JUViENILE JUST. & DELINQUENCY PREVENTON ADviSORY Comm. OF HRS, PROILE OF DH.u4-
QUENCY CASES AT VARIoUS STAGES OF Tm FLORIDA JuvENE JUSnCE SYSTEM: 1982-83 THROUGH
1989-90, Ch. VIII, 1st graph (unpaginated) (undated). Further, out of those totals, the number
of blacks and other minorities who were transferred during the same period increased from 1574
to 3181. Id. at 6th graph.
116. Status Conf. Order Implementing Compliance with Monitors' Findings (Dec. 20, 1989)
(corrected version entered Mar. 8, 1990).
117. Id.
118. Stip. Am. Pop. Reduction Schedule of Consent Decree (filed July 12, 1990), approved
by court (July 21, 1990).
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with legal representation."" 9 The plan primarily relied on a nonlawyer
staff person to serve as a legal services coordinator accessing legal
services from Public Defenders, Legal Services attorneys, HRS district
legal counsel, and others. No provision of onsite legal services was
envisioned. After plaintiffs objected to this plan, Monitor DeMuro
effected an interim compromise whereby the defendants' plan would
be implemented at Dozier and an attorney would be hired through a
grant from the Eckerd Youth Family Alternatives Foundation at
EYDC. A monitor was to examine the two methods to determine if
the youths were obtaining access to legal representation. 20
Implementation of the legal plan at EYDC became problematic.
Plaintiffs objected to the contract terms between EYDC and the attor-
ney it hired because the contract did not provide sufficient money and
prohibited travel by the attorney. After the initial contract expired,
the parties negotiated another plan whereby EYDC would replicate
the Dozier model.'12 The Legal Services Monitor recently found that
both plans were being implemented in reasonable compliance with the
consent decree.'2
To comply with the status conference order, the multidisciplinary
assessment process was completed on paper,'2 although it still has yet
to be fully implemented.'2 Finally, regarding the implementation of a
continuum of care and services, HRS in early 1990 convened a state-
wide task force of various HRS personnel to determine the ideal con-
tinuum.'21 The task force never submitted a final report. Under the
pressure of a federal court deadline, and in the absence of any HRS
continuum plan that the 1990 Legislature could review, however, the
Legislature fashioned its own continuum plan. 26 In addition, to con-
form the existing juvenile code to the Bobby M. requirements, and to
improve the functioning of the juvenile justice system, the Legislature
embarked on a wholesale revision of the various statutes affecting de-
linquency. 27
119. Stip. Concerning Legal Servs. at the Training Schools, Ex. A (filed Sept. 11, 1990),
approved by court (Sept. 18, 1990).
120. Id. passim.
121. Negotiations continue toward finalizing a new stipulation concerning legal services.
122. Legal Services Monitor Spudeas Report to Court 12 (Nov. 18, 1991).
123. Notice of Filing Comprehensive Case Assessment Policy (Jan. 19, 1990).
124. See Court Monitor DeMuro Report to Court 8 (May 30, 1991).
125. Dep't of HRS, Children, Youth & Family Servs., Juvenile Justice Continuum Task
Force Agenda for Meeting (Jan. 30, 1991).
126. Ch. 90-209, 1990 Fla. Laws 920, 1095, 1104 (line items 978A, 1000A).
127. Ch. 90-208, 1990 Fla. Laws 1082.
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B. The Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 1990 and Its Aftermath
Around the time that HRS was convening its task force, juvenile
justice issues were gaining momentum around the state because of the
delinquency system crisis. The Save Our Children Campaign, spear-
headed by House Speaker Tom Gustafson,1' was underway in the
Legislature. 29 The Juvenile Justice System Review Task Force, cre-
ated by the 1989 Legislature, submitted its final report in 1990.130 The
Florida Bar formed a Commission on Children and proposed legisla-
tive changes.' The statutorily-authorized Crime Prevention and Law
Enforcement Study Commission issued its report with a section ad-
dressing juvenile offenders. 3 2 Justice Fellowship also commissioned a
report. 3 3 In addition to the various reports condemning the status quo
and calling for restructuring and a significant enhancement of re-
sources, there was a firestorm of support from the editorial boards of
the state's major daily newspapers. 34
Children were a top priority in the 1990 legislative session, with
many important initiatives developed to improve the quality of their
lives. Because of the Bobby M. decree requirements and the wide-
spread concern for the juvenile justice system's management-by-crisis,
the Florida Legislature passed the Juvenile Justice Reform Act of
128. Dem., Fort Lauderdale, 1976-1990.
129. See FLA. H.R., SAVE OUR CHILDREN (Univ. S. Fla. 1990).
130. JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM REVIEW TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT OF FINDINGS AND RE-
COMMENDATIONS TO THE GOVERNOR, ATTORNEY GENERAL, PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE, AND THE
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (Mar. 1990) (on file with Southern Legal Counsel).
131. THE FLA. BAR COMM'N FOR CHILDREN, 1990 LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS (Jan. 1990) (availa-
ble from The Florida Bar, Tallahassee, Fla.).
132. CRIME PREVENTION AND LAW ENFORCEMENT STUDY COMM'N, MASTER PLANNING FOR
FLORIDA'S CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (Jan. 1990). The Commission was authorized by Ch. 87-
243, § 54, 1987 Fla. Laws 215, 291, amended by Ch. 88-381, § 16, 1988 Fla. Laws 1447, 1459,
amended by Ch. 89-526, § 49, 1989 Fla. Laws 2657, 2688.
133. H. TED RUBIN, INST. FOR CT. MANAGEMENT OF THE NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., FLOWI-
DA'S JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM: A TURNING PoINT (Feb. 1990) (available from The National
Center for State Courts, Denver, Colo.).
134. A sampling of the editorial headlines follows: Grand Jury Should Investigate Lack of
Juvenile-Care Funding, FLA. TaMs UNION, July 22, 1990; Dead Aim at Juveniles-Legislature
'90, MIAx HERALD, May 25, 1990; Prevention is Better-Help Juveniles Before They Become
Career Criminals, LAXELAND LEDGER, May 17, 1990; Juvenile Justice Aid So Pressing That It's
a Matter of Conscience, FLA. TIMES UNION, May 15, 1990; Kids Need More Than Prison-
There's Still a Chance to Help Young Offenders, FT. MYERS NEws-PRESS, May 14, 1990; Youth
Rehabilitation Can Pay Off by Cutting Down on Adult Criminals, FT. LAUDERDALE SUN-SENTI-
NEL, May 7, 1990; Youth Injustice: Right This Wrong-Move That Bill, TALLAHASSEE DEMo-
CRAT, May 3, 1990; Juvenile inJustice-Florida Errs on Priorities, MIMIl HERALD, Apr. 27,
1990; State's Children in Trouble Not Getting Juvenile Justice, PENSACOLA NEWS JOURNAL, Apr.
1, 1990; Schools for Crime-Revamp Juvenile Justice, GAINESVILLE SUN, Feb. 8, 1990; Smaller
Programs for Delinquents Would Help Youths, Cost State Less, FT. LAUDERDALE SUN-SENTI-
NEL, Jan. 23, 1990; Fixing Juvenile Justice, A System Out of Control, GAn;ESvIILE SUN, Nov.
13, 1989.
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1990.135 The Act was premised on the creation of a variety of small,
community-based programs and services.1 36 Some facilities would of-
fer services for special needs offenders, such as treatment for drug
and substance abusers, sex offenders, serious habitual offenders, and
those in need of mental health services. The programs also would vary
in their level of security so that a continuum could be created that was
based on the programmatic needs of individual youths as well as their
security risk to the public. 3 7
The Act also established a case management system whereby case
managers would be responsible for a particular youth throughout his
or her care with HRS.1 38 Further, nonsecure detention, a new alterna-
tive to secure or home detention, was authorized. 139 The development
and use of a risk assessment instrument for intake detention decisions
also was mandated.Y° A juvenile civil citation system was authorized
to provide an efficient and innovative alternative to HRS custody for
children "who commit nonserious delinquent acts and to ensure swift
and appropriate consequences., 1 41 The Act also created an independ-
ent, ongoing Commission on Juvenile Justice to monitor the Act's im-
plementation and to make recommendations to the Legislature on
juvenile justice programmatic and fiscal policies and practices.14 2 The
Legislature appropriated approximately $52 million in new funding
for these programs,143 which would have annualized to $101 million
for fiscal year 1991-1992. 4
HRS immediately began to implement the Act; however, the eupho-
ria of obtaining sufficient resources to design an appropriate contin-
uum soon began to fade. Substantial revenue shortfalls were projected
for the State; budget cuts were mandated. In November 1990, $9.6
million145 was cut from the juvenile justice reforms. When another
135. Ch. 90-208, 1990 Fla. Laws 1082.
136. See, e.g., id., § 5, at 1034-35 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 39.055 (Supp. 1990)).
137. Id. § 2, at 1038.
138. Id. at 1120-24 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 39.047 (Supp. 1990)). Case managers are as-
signed only to those youths who are not released or referred to a diversionary program, commu-
nity arbitration, or some other agency or program for the purpose of nonofficial or nonjudicial
handling. FLA. STAT. § 39.047(1)(a) (Supp. 1990).
139. Ch. 90-208, § 3, 1990 Fla. Laws 1082, 1089-90 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 39.01(16)
(Supp. 1990)). Nonsecure detention is a group home-type environment for children who are per-
mitted to be on home detention but who do not have a viable home for release.
140. Ch. 90-208, § 5, 1990 Fla. Laws 1094, 1111-12 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 39.042(3)
(Supp. 1990)).
141. Id. at 1103-04 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 39.0255 (Supp. 1990)).
142. Id. at 1099-1101 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 39.023 (Supp. 1990)).
143. Ch. 90-209, 1990 Fla. Laws 1165, 1340-43, 1349-55 (ine items 978A, 1000A).
144. Coa,,s'N JUVENILE JUST., 1991 ANNUAL REP. TO FLA. LEG. 19 (1991).
145. Court Monitor DeMuro Report to Court, at app. 1 (Feb. 18, 1991). The appendix states
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shortfall in January 1991 threatened to cut up to $44 million from the
original $52 million, 146 plaintiffs informed the Governor that they
would seek enforcement and contempt if the continuum reforms were
dismantled. 147 In response, the defendants agreed to phase in the pro-
grams and services over a three-year period to take into account the
revenue shortfalls. The 1991 Legislature appropriated $8 million in
"new" juvenile justice revenue, 148 which essentially served to restore a
portion of the earlier cuts.
Recent monitoring reports express continuing frustration at the cha-
otic condition of the juvenile justice system.149 In fact, the system
seems to be worsening. One indicator of its worsening status is that
the waiting list for placements throughout the juvenile justice system
has grown to more than 1000 youths.150 The solution, however, in-
volves more than additional resources.151 According to the monitor,
many of the current programs have extremely high recidivism rates
and other indicators of poor program development and manage-
ment. 52 Further, in light of a recent Dade Grand Jury report 53 and a
programmatic evaluation conducted by HRS, 1 4 the problems with the
current programs are well known within the system. 155 Better program
management throughout the delinquency system remains a serious
goal.
that the 1990 appropriation was approximately $37 million. This amount covers only Specific
Appropriation 1000A for Department of HRS Children, Youth & Family Services. The remain-
ing $15 million was funded in Specific Appropriation 978A for Department of HRS Alcohol,
Drug Abuse & Mental Health, which was largely unaffected by the budget cuts. See Court Moni-
tor DeMuro Report to Court, app. 1 (Aug. 9, 1991).
146. Letter from Elaine P. Krupnick, Chair, Comm'n on Juvenile Just., to Colleague (July
10, 1991) (form letter accompanying transmitted results of two commission surveys).
147. Letter from A.J. Hadeed, pls.' counsel, to Gov.-elect Chiles & Lt. Gov.-elect MacKay
(Jan. 4, 1991) (on file with Gov. and with Southern Legal Counsel).
148. Ch. 91-193, 1991 Fla. Laws 1622.
149. See Court Monitor DeMuro Reports to Court (Nov. 21, 1991) & (May 30, 1991).
150. Court Monitor DeMuro Report to Court 2-3 (Nov. 21, 1991); Court Monitor DeMuro
Report to Court 4 (May 30,1991).
151. Court Monitor DeMuro Report to Court 2-3 (Nov. 21, 1991); Court Monitor DeMuro
Report to Court 7 (May 30, 1991).
152. Court Monitor DeMuro Report to Court 1-2 (Nov. 21, 1991); Court Monitor DeMuro
Report to Court 5 (May 30, 1991).
153. The Dade Grand Jury made many negative observations of the programs in Dade
County. It referred to community control as a "headless monster doing more harm than good"
and stated that the Dade Halfway House "as presently structured, left us with a sense of institu-
tional gloom and ultimate criminal doom." See Court Monitor DeMuro Report to Court 5-6
(May 30, 1991) (quoting Dade Grand Jury Report).
154. DEP'T OF HRS, CHILDREN, YouTH & FAMILY SaRvs., Otrrcom EVALUATION REPORT
(Dec. 1990).
155. Id. at 5-6.
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A July 1991 survey conducted by the Commission on Juvenile
Justice confirms that the reforms envisioned by the Bobby M. consent
decree and subsequently by the 1990 Legislature are far from being
realized. The responses from HRS personnel reflect a deep frustration
and loss of morale since the funding cutbacks.' 56 Regarding the failure
to establish a continuum of care, one survey respondent wrote:
The litany of failure continues. Florida continues to place youths in
juvenile detention centers in large numbers for long periods without
providing meaningful programs or alternatives. Early intervention
and prevention are important and potentially successful. However,
we are past that point. We have a generation of youth who[m] we
have failed to intervene with and redirect. We must have programs at
the commitment level to deal with this growing group of repeat
offenders. If we are not going to deal with the problem in the
juvenile system, lets [sic] admit defeat and treat 16 year olds as
adults and quit trying to deceive ourselves and the public. 57
In October 1991, more budget cuts were threatened. However, the
Florida Supreme Court ruled that it was an unconstitutional delega-
tion of legislative authority for the Governor to cut the state budget. 5
In response, the Governor called a special session to address the
budget shortfalls. No juvenile justice programs were impacted.
V. USES AND LIMrATIoNs OF SYsTEMIc REFORM LITIGATION
Bobby M. certainly vastly improved the conditions at the training
schools. Today, they are relatively safe, sanitary and rehabilitation-
oriented environments. Its impact on reforming the rest of the juve-
nile justice system, however, cannot yet be determined-efforts are
still underway to bring the defendants into compliance with the com-
munity programs sections (VI and VII) of the consent decree.
The cumbersome process of federal action changes systems with
neither ease nor swiftness, yet federal court orders have the advantage
of superseding the broken promises of state officials. 5 9 Although the
156. CoMM'N ON JUVENME JUST., 1991 STATE-WIDE SURVEY Rsums: DISTRICT PERSoNNEL
op HRS (July 12, 1991) (on file with Comm'n on Juvenile Just., Tallahassee, Fla.).
157. Id. at 5.
158. Chiles v. Children A, B, C, D, E, & F, 589 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 1991).
159. State and local laws, practices and policies that conflict with federal constitutional, stat-
utory or regulatory requirements are invalid under the supremacy clause of the United States
Constitution. English v. General Elec. Co., 110 S. Ct. 2270 (1990) (statutory preemption); Rey-
nolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 584 (1964) (constitutional preemption). See also Badgley v. Santa-
croce, 800 F.2d 33, 38 (2d Cir. 1986) (federal court consent decree entitled to supremacy
overriding conflicting state law or state court order).
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full vision of Bobby M. is not yet realized, it is possible that, without
the consent decrees in place, state officials would ease the current
waiting list and budgetary and management crisis by filling the train-
ing schools far beyond capacity. In the words of a former training
school superintendent, without limitations on the numbers or kinds of
children admitted, the schools would become "rubber walls." Over-
crowding would lead to deteriorating conditions, potentially leaving
the training schools in worse shape than when the suit was initiated.
To accomplish a truly appropriate juvenile justice system, advocacy
efforts must continue by all those concerned with the welfare of chil-
dren. The Bobby M. court monitor and team of experts must perse-
vere. The Commission on Juvenile Justice must proceed with its
oversight of the implementation of the Juvenile Justice Reform Act.
Those involved with the delivery of services must carry on despite high
caseloads and a fragmented continuum. The media must continue to
make the public aware of the successes and shortfalls of the juvenile
justice system. Local initiatives must continue to establish Children's
Service Councils. 160 And concerned citizens across the state must per-
sist in legislative lobbying for increased money and better agency man-
agement.
Systemic reform litigation is more effective when conducted in tan-
dem with other efforts. Federal judges can hold state officials ac-
countable, 16' but it is not the judge who must implement reforms.
Only state officials can move the enormous and resistant bureaucra-
cies. If the two forces unite, a court order coupled with vigilance by
all concerned may generate the necessary resources and move the sys-
tem to true reforms.
160. See FLA. STAT. § 125.901 (1989); See also McDaniels v. Florida, 583 So. 2d 349, 351
(Fla. 4th DCA 1991) (Glickstein, J., concurring).
161. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L. REV.
1281 (1976); Donald L. Horowitz, Decreeing Organizational Change: Judicial Supervision of
Public Institutions, 1983 Duxn L.J. 1265 (1983); Frank M. Johnson, Jr., The Role of the Fed-
eral Courts in Institutional Litigation, 32 ALA. L. Rnv. 271 (1981).
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